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Educating for Intellectual Humility
and Conviction
DUNCAN PRITCHARD
It is argued that two plausible goals of the educational
enterprise are (i) to develop the intellectual character, and thus
the intellectual virtues, of the student, and (ii) to develop the
student’s intellectual self-confidence, such that they are able to
have conviction in what they believe. On the face of it, however,
these two educational goals seem to be in tension with one
another, at least insofar as intellectual humility is a genuine
intellectual virtue. This is because intellectual humility seems
to require that one does not have conviction in one’s beliefs. It
is argued that this tension can be avoided so long as we have
the right account of intellectual humility in play. This enables
us to understand what educating for intellectual humility
might involve, and how it might co-exist with the educational
development of a student’s intellectual self-confidence.
A PUZZLE
Let us begin with a puzzle. For the purposes of this essay, I will take it as
obvious that at least one of the roles of education is to instill good character
traits into the student. Relatedly, I take it that this entails that educational
practices ought to help students develop their virtues—i.e., those character
traits that constitute excellences of character. If that is right, then it follows
that one of the roles of education is to develop the student’s intellectual
character, and thus her intellectual virtues specifically. Indeed, one might
plausibly argue—or, at least, I have argued elsewhere anyway—that the
overarching epistemic role of education is to develop intellectual character
and thus the intellectual virtues.1
Here is another goal of education that we would surely find compelling,
which is to enable students to have self-confidence, and thereby to have the
strength of their convictions. We do not want our students to be wracked
with self-doubt, nor do we want them to be the kind of people who are
willing to change their minds at the drop of a hat (or, perhaps worse, at the
first sign of any resistance to their opinions, such as in their peer group).
Just as the virtues are held to be important components of a good life, so we
might reasonably imagine that self-confidence and conviction also play a
role in this regard. Indeed, we might plausibly contend that self-confidence
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and conviction are pre-requisites for leading a virtuously good life. As we
might put the point, how could one manifest virtues while in the grip of
self-doubt?2
Here is where we get the puzzle, for is not humility a virtue? It certainly
looks like one. It is hard, for example, to imagine an ideally virtuous person
who lacks such a trait. It also has the right structural properties to be a
virtue. Humility seems to be the kind of trait that one needs to cultivate,
for instance. One is not born humble, except in the purely descriptive sense
of having a humble origin; rather one becomes humble because one has
been raised appropriately (or has trained oneself to be humble). Like other
virtues, humility is thus acquired and maintained in a distinctive fashion.
Moreover, like other virtues, humility lies on a mean between two vices,
one of excess and one of deficiency. The arrogant person lacks humility, and
so exhibits a vice of deficiency. But one can also be excessively humble, by
debasing oneself continually and unnecessarily, and that would be a vice of
excess. In any case, in what follows we will grant the claim that humility
is a virtue.3 If that is right, then it surely ought to follow that intellectual
humility is also a virtue.4
But does not intellectual humility stand precisely in opposition to self-
confidence and conviction? Indeed, is not manifesting self-confidence and
conviction the kind of thing that the intellectually arrogant, and thus intel-
lectually viceful, person does? Relatedly, if there is this tension between,
on the one hand, intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue, and, on the
other hand, self-confidence and conviction, then how is the educator to co-
herently educate for both? Must they sacrifice one of these goals at the altar
of the other? If so, which one? Or is there a way of reconciling these goals
of education?
In this paper I will be arguing for the latter resolution. As we will see, in
order to do this we need to have the right conception of intellectual humility
(and thus humility simpliciter) in play, as the puzzle in effect trades on
erroneous (albeit widely held, as we will see) conceptions of this notion.
Once we understand the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility correctly,
then the puzzle will disappear and it will be clear how an educator can—
indeed, should—consistently aim for the educational goal of developing
intellectual character while also instilling within students a healthy level of
self-confidence.
HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
Before turning to intellectual humility, specifically, let us step back a little
and consider the nature of the virtue of humility more generally. Given that,
as we just noted, humility is opposed to the vice of arrogance, it is tempting
to think that it must involve a downgraded, and hence inaccurate, assessment
of oneself in the relevant respects (e.g. of one’s abilities and achievements).5
This certainly seems to be closest to our everyday conception of humility,
in that on this conception the genuinely humble do not merely behave as
if they have a downgraded conception of themselves (which is compatible
with this being a mere pretence), but rather they really do imagine that they
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are somehow ‘lesser’ than they in fact are (think, for example, of the stories
of the humility shown by certain saints).
Such a conception of humility as a virtue is problematic, however, since
it implies that the virtuous subject ought to have inaccurate beliefs about
herself. (Remember in this regard that the humble person on this conception
is not merely acting as if she has a downgraded conception of herself, but
that she really does think less of herself in this way). But how can virtue
demand inaccuracy? Notice that on this account of the virtue of humility,
having an accurate conception of oneself in the relevant respects would
constitute a vice!
Indeed, we can bring this point into sharper relief by letting such an
account of the virtue of humility carry over into an account of intellec-
tual humility specifically. The idea would now be that one is required to
have a downgraded, and hence inaccurate, conception of one’s intellec-
tual/cognitive abilities and achievements specifically. But how could it be
that an intellectual virtue—a character trait that is specifically geared to-
wards the epistemic good—is constituted by inaccuracy in this way? More-
over, as before, having an accurate conception of one’s intellectual/cognitive
abilities and achievements would now constitute an intellectual vice, which
on the face of it seems absurd.
If we think that inaccuracy and virtue—intellectual virtue at any rate—
cannot go hand-in-hand in this manner, then how might we tweak the
proposal to accommodate this fact? There are two main ways one might
be tempted to go, but neither is particularly appealing on closer analysis.
One idea could be to argue that she who manifests the virtue of humility is
merely required to act as if she has a downgraded conception of herself in the
relevant respects, while at the same time in fact having a broadly accurate
conception of herself in this regard. The same would go, mutatis mutandis,
for manifestations of the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility.
That would evade the problem in hand, since there is now no demand
for inaccuracy in one’s beliefs being a requirement for virtue, much less
intellectual virtue. But the inherent tension in the idea that a genuine mani-
festation of virtue should demand inaccuracy in one’s beliefs is here merely
replaced with a new inherent tension along the same general lines. For is
not the idea that a genuine manifestation of virtue should require pretence
of this fashion prima facie implausible? It seems to suggest that there is
something inauthentic, if not simply deceitful, about the practices of the
virtuous subject. Indeed, this account generates a very similar problem to
that faced by the previous proposal, in that it now follows that someone
who transparently acts in ways that manifest what she in fact believes about
herself—i.e. who is not pretending to have a downgraded conception of
herself—would be on this view be manifesting a vice, and that seems very
counterintuitive.
This problem becomes even more marked once we turn our attentions to
intellectual humility specifically. Given that intellectual virtues are directed
towards the intellectual goods, how can they be compatible with a manifes-
tation of intellectual virtue that constitutively demands pretence on one’s
part that will inevitably mislead others as to what one truly believes about
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oneself? Similarly, how could it be that someone who does not mislead
others in this fashion, or otherwise pretends to be other than they are in this
regard, would thereby be manifesting an intellectual vice, which is what
this view seems to entail?
With this in mind, one might think that one can capture what drives the
folk conception of humility without having to appeal to either inaccuracy or
pretence. Perhaps it is enough that one simply recognises one’s limitations
and failings, and thereby takes due ownership of them? That is, one might
argue that our natural state is one in which we tend to overestimate ourselves
(e.g. our achievements, the level of our abilities, and so on), in which case
there is room for the humble to be those who set themselves apart from
the crowd by cultivating the trait of being humble, and thereby forming
a more accurate conception of themselves, one that they actively embrace
(i.e. rather than rail against).6 If that is right, then it suggests a conception
of the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility such that one recognises
one’s specifically cognitive limitations and failings, and hence one takes
ownership of this more accurate picture of one’s cognitive agency (i.e. as
before, by being content to embrace these limitations). Indeed, just such an
account of intellectual humility has arguably been the dominant account in
the recent literature, with variations of this view proposed by a number of
prominent authors.7
This proposal certainly fares better than the idea that one should have a
downgraded conception of oneself, or the related claim that one should have
an accurate conception of oneself but merely act as if one has a downgraded
conception of oneself regardless. This is because it is not committed the
idea of (intellectual) virtue demanding either inaccuracy in one’s beliefs
or pretence about what one believes, both of which we noted above were
problematic in this regard, particularly as regards the virtue of intellectual
humility. Relatedly, this account is not committed to claiming that man-
ifestations of accurate belief about oneself, or behaviour which honestly
displays what one in fact believes about oneself, are thereby expressions
of vice, as the former two accounts entailed. Indeed, on the present view
one can think of the relevant (intellectual) vices of excess and deficiency in
terms of, respectively, overestimating one’s (intellectual) achievements and
abilities and underestimating one’s (intellectual) achievements and abilities.
Unfortunately, this account of the virtue of humility, and thus intellectual
humility, is problematic in other ways. This is because it does not capture
the essentially other-regarding aspect of humility. Imagine, for example,
someone who is completely brilliant at everything she does—and far su-
perior to everyone else—and she knows it. On this proposal, this person
could be fully aware of the very limited nature of her cognitive failings
compared to everyone else, take full ownership of those cognitive failings
(small as they are), and yet nonetheless act in superior ways to those around
her. For example, she might (privately at least) belittle the abilities and
achievements of those she works with, look down her nose at others, make
fun of how useless they are at various tasks compared to her, and so on. On
this account, such arrogance would be entirely compatible with the man-
ifestation of the virtue of humility, since this behaviour would be firmly
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rooted in our subject’s entirely accurate conception of herself. And yet such
manifestly arrogant behaviour is surely deeply incompatible with the virtue
of humility; indeed, as we saw above, it is the very vice of deficiency that
is associated with this virtue.
The same applies if we extend this account to intellectual humility. Some-
one who is intellectually brilliant, and knows full well that they are, can
own their cognitive fallibility and cognitive limitations (such as they are),
whilst nonetheless acting in superior ways to those around them. For ex-
ample, they might play (harmless) intellectual games with people for their
own amusement, or simply feel a warm smug feeling whenever they engage
with their intellectual inferiors. This would surely be to manifest intellectual
arrogance, which is the vice of deficiency that corresponds with the virtue
of intellectual humility. And yet given that they clearly are intellectually su-
perior to those around them, acting in this way would be entirely compatible
with them owning their intellectual limitations.
One might respond to such cases by arguing that although there is vice in
play, it is not viceful behaviour that has anything to dowith themanifestation
of (intellectual) humility. So, for example, one might claim that the vice in
play in each case concerns a separate virtue like kindness (insofar as that is
a genuine virtue; I take no stand on this here). If that were right, then one
could argue that the individuals in both of these cases are manifesting the
virtue of (intellectual) humility, it is just that they are failing to manifest
other virtues that they ought to have.
But I do not think that this is at all plausible as a response to the difficulty
in hand. For one thing, as we noted above, the behaviours being exhibited
by our viceful agents seem precisely to concern a specific deficiency with
regard to the virtue of (intellectual) humility. These behaviours are explicitly
arrogant, after all.Moreover, remember that viceful behaviour can be viceful
with regard to more than one vice, just as virtuous behaviour can be virtuous
with regard to more than one virtue. So there is nothing amiss in the idea that
our individuals are manifesting behaviour that is both arrogant and unkind,
just as there can be virtuous behaviour that is both, say, courageous and
just.
Furthermore, notice that although we described the cases such that there
was, arguably anyway, other viceful behaviour on display, such as unkind-
ness, it is far from obvious that this is essential to such cases. What is key
to these examples is just that the individuals concerned, despite owning
their cognitive failings and limitations, are nonetheless completely self-
regarding. With that in mind, we can easily conceive of such cases where
no other vices are on display. Perhaps, for example, our protagonists simply
keep reminding others of their (intellectual) achievements, and of their own
(intellectual) superiority, but without any malice or unkindness on display.
Indeed, we can even imagine that they have the good social sense not to
behave in ways that might annoy others, but are secretly self-regarding,
in that they are focused on their own (intellectual) superiority nonetheless,
even despite this being hidden by their outward behaviour. That would suf-
fice to determine that one is not (intellectually) humble, but rather arrogant
(albeit secretly perhaps). The upshot is that merely owning one’s failings
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and limitations, cognitive or otherwise, is not enough to manifest the virtue
of (intellectual) humility.8
INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY RECONSIDERED
So how, then, are we to understand humility, and thus intellectual humility,
if not along the problematic lines just described? I think that we can learn
from the difficulties facing these other proposals in order to work out what
the right account should be. Let us recap on what we have discovered so
far. First, that the virtues, especially the intellectual virtues, cannot consti-
tutively involve inaccuracy. Second, that the virtues, perhaps especially the
intellectual virtues, cannot constitutively involve pretence, deceit or inau-
thenticity. Third, that mere ownership of one’s (intellectual) failings and
limitations does not suffice for (intellectual) humility, as one could satisfy
this requirement while nonetheless being completely self-regarding in ways
that are incompatible with (intellectual) humility.
Putting all this together, what we want is an account of (intellectual)
humility that involves an accurate conception of oneself in the relevant
respects, involves no pretence, deceit or inauthenticity, and which excludes
the kinds of self-regarding traits that were allowed on the ‘self-ownership’
account of (intellectual) humility. I claim that what is key here is that humil-
ity, and thus intellectual humility, is an essentially other-regarding virtue.
What I mean by this is that humility involves the essentially other-directed
dispositions of, for example, respecting other people’s abilities and achieve-
ments, being genuinely open to criticism of one’s actions, being willing to
respectfully listen to other people’s opinions, and so on. In contrast, humil-
ity is inconsistent with one having those characteristic dispositions that are
involved in excessive self-regard, such as conceit, arrogance, haughtiness
and so on. Similarly, intellectual humility will involve the intellectual equiv-
alents of these characteristically other-regarding dispositions, such as being
open to points of view different from one’s own, being willing to change
one’s mind if necessary, being willing to further reflect on the soundness of
one’s beliefs if called upon to do so, and so on.9
Note that it is important to such dispositions—in keeping with the man-
ifestations of virtues more generally—that they are grounded in the right
kinds of motivational states. In order to properly manifest these essentially
other-regarding dispositions, the dispositions need to arise out of a genuine
concern and respect for others; this cannot be mere play-acting. Acting
as if one respects other peoples’ opinions, when in fact one secretly does
not respect other peoples’ points of view, is not to manifest an essentially
other-regarding disposition in the sense that interests us here. Accordingly,
when, for example, the intellectually humble listen carefully to the opinions
of others, reflect on them, and engage with others accordingly, in a spirit of
joint intellectual enterprise, then this is not a pretence on their part, but a
manifestation of genuine intellectual respect for the other party (even if, as
we will see in a moment, that other party is by all accounts their intellectual
inferior).
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This way of thinking about intellectual humility not only excludes pre-
tence in relevant respects but is also not in conflict with the intellectual goal
of accuracy. For example, one might accurately recognise that one is better
informed about the topic in hand to those around one, and yet nonetheless
exhibit this virtue. Recognising this intellectual superiority, after all, need
not prevent one from being suitably respectful to other people’s viewpoints.
Now one might initially be puzzled by this line. For if one really does
accurately recognise one’s intellectual superiority, then why would one be
respectful of the opinions of one’s intellectual inferiors? Put another way,
insofar as one does behave in respectful ways towards their opinions, then
is not one simply humouring them, such that this is really a kind of pretence
on one’s part, rather than genuine intellectual respect?
This complaint misunderstands the nature of an other-regarding virtue
like (intellectual) humility. It is inevitably the case that one might well not
learn very much from an engagement with someone who is an intellectual
inferior with regard to the topic in hand. Even this possibility should not be
discounted, however, particularly in the educational context that interests
us. The teacher, after all, is often in a situation of being intellectual superior
to her pupils with regard to the teaching subject matter at hand. And yet,
as all teachers will recognise, it is not uncommon that in trying to explain
difficult newmaterial to those unfamiliar with it that one gains a new insight
into that topic (for example, as when the pupil asks an unexpected question
which makes one look at the topic in a new way).
But even if we grant that the possibility of learning something from
this engagement with the less informed subject has been discounted, this
does not undermine the importance of manifesting intellectual humility.
For the whole point of this being an other-regarding virtue is that it is not
to be evaluated in terms of one’s own intellectual gains in manifesting it.
Rather, it should be evaluated in terms of how manifestation of this virtue
intellectually benefits others.10 I think the best way to capture this thought is
to conceive of intellectual humility as being rooted in a genuine intellectual
concern for others. One wants them to enjoy intellectual goods, and so one
wishes to engage with them to help them to acquire such goods. This last
point is very important, since it reminds us that the strategies in play here
are not merely instrumental. It could well be, for example, that the most
effective way to get people to have lots of true beliefs is to simply tell them
what is what. But having genuine intellectual concern for others is not just
about ensuring that they maximise their true beliefs but also about how they
get to the truth. That is why the intellectually humble do not merely tell
others what to believe, even when they are clearly the better informed, but
rather seek instead genuinely to intellectually engage with others to help
them to see the truth for themselves. They want others to appreciate the truth
as they do, and not merely passively accept what others tell them. Again,
think of the good teacher in this regard. At least where there is time to do
so, she would surely prefer to facilitate students in the difficult process of
learning for themselves, rather than simply ‘cramming’ them with facts.11
For our purposes, what is absolutely crucial about the account of intel-
lectual humility that we have set out is that it is entirely compatible with
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sticking to one’s guns, even in the face of disagreement from those around
you. Of course, it is not compatible with always sticking to one’s guns in
the light of disagreement, as that would indeed be dogmatism. But in cases
where one is legitimately confident of one’s judgement—where one knows
that one has special expertise or knowledge that those around one lacks,
say, or where this is simply a topic that one knows one has put a due level
of thought into—then having the conviction of one’s opinions is entirely
compatible with one not being dogmatic or intellectually arrogant. The key
thing is that what makes one intellectually arrogant, and thus lacking in
intellectual humility, is not the inward conviction that one has in one’s
opinions, but rather one’s outward behaviour towards others and the under-
lying values that it represents. In particular, one can have the courage of
one’s convictions and yet nonetheless behave in ways that express a genuine
intellectual respect and concern for others. There is thus no essential tension
between intellectual self-confidence and intellectual humility.12
THE PUZZLE RESOLVED
We are now in a position to resolve the puzzle with which we began. Recall
that the puzzle arose because it seemed that two key epistemic goals of
the educator—that of educating for intellectual self-confidence and that of
educating for intellectual virtue, including intellectual humility—were in
conflict with one another. But we have seen that these epistemic goals
are not essentially in conflict at all, in that when intellectual humility is
properly understood then it is entirely compatible with having the courage
of one’s convictions where that is epistemically appropriate, and thus with
being intellectually self-confident. There is thus no reason why the educator
cannot both develop a student’s intellectual virtues and also her intellectual
self-confidence.
Indeed, notice that from an educational point of view how difficult it
would be to educate for intellectual humility on some of the conceptions of
this notion that we have critiqued, at least insofar as the educator is trying
to develop the intellectual character of her students. The latter goal, after
all, will involve developing their concern for the truth, and thus establishing
good practices for getting to the truth. That will put a premium on accuracy,
in contrast to a conception of intellectual humility that essentially involves
inaccuracy. It will also put a premium on sincerity in the intellectual realm,
in contrast to a conception of intellectual humility that essentially involves
pretence.
The conception of intellectual humility that involves embracing one’s
fallibility fares better on this score, since as we saw above it involves no
essential appeal to inaccuracy or pretence. But it is still in tension with
having a good intellectual character, since it is compatible with someone
who is aware of their intellectual superiority and acting accordingly. In
educating for intellectual self-confidence and intellectual humility with this
account of the latter in play, one is in danger of creating students who exhibit
dismissive attitudes to those less knowledgeable than they are, and hence
being intellectually arrogant in the process. Indeed, one would expect that
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the goal of enhancing their intellectual self-confidence will, if anything,
make this tendency all the worse.
I want to close by noting how important it is that we are able to resolve this
puzzle for our educational practices. For I think that now, more than ever
before, it is vitally important to develop citizens who have both the courage
of their convictions, when epistemically appropriate, while also exhibiting
the intellectual respect for others that we have seen to be characteristic of
intellectual humility. It is the latter that is so lacking in our current public
life, where political discourse is often little more than name-calling and
mudslinging. Here conviction has been allowed to drown out intellectual
humility, with devastating results.
But it is important to recognise that the problem is not conviction itself,
as if this difficulty would be resolved by everyone being doubtful of what
they believe. Conviction can be epistemically appropriate, in which case
it should be on display, and not hidden. What is key is to recognise that
one can display one’s conviction in ways that are entirely intellectually
respectful of others, and thus compatible with intellectual humility. That is
what we need to strive for in public life: conviction where it is epistemically
appropriate and manifested in ways that express intellectual humility. But
for that to happenwe need to educate the next generate to realise that they do
not need to choose between conviction and intellectual humility. Properly
understood they should rightly strive for both, and it is part of the job of the
educator to help facilitate their success in this regard.13
Correspondence: Duncan Pritchard, Department of Philosophy, Univer-
sity of California, Irvine, 85 Humanities Instructional Building, Irvine, CA
92697–4555, USA.
Email: dhpritch@uci.edu
NOTES
1. See, especially, Pritchard, 2016b; see also Pritchard, 2013, 2014b, 2018b. For a useful overview
of the literature on the epistemic aim(s) of education, see Robertson, 2009.
2. The idea that self-confidence and conviction are pre-requisites of a virtuous life, while prima
facie plausible, is not without its problems. For example, could one lead a virtuous life which
embodies a thoroughgoing scepticism, of the kind one finds in Pyrrhonian thought? Pyrrhonian
scepticism was clearly thought of by its practitioners as an ethical stance, in the sense that the
route to eudemonia was via sceptical doubt. Of course, the larger question is whether such a
sceptical ethical stance is compatible with a virtue-theoretic account of eudaimonia, at least given
the rationalistic commitments presupposed in the latter. But there are some interpretations of
Pyrrhonian sceptical doubt where it retains very similar commitments. See especially Perin, 2010;
see also Pritchard, forthcoming b and c. In any case, it would clearly take us too far afield to get
into these issues here.
3. Most commentators would accept this claim, but for some pushback in this regard, see Bloomfield,
2017a, 2017b.
4. In what follows, I am going to take this entailment to be straightforward. That said, in conversation
both Paul Bloomfield and Michael Lynch have suggested to me that there might be good reasons
why the entailment does not hold—e.g. that one could regard ‘intellectual humility’ as very much a
term of art, and hence a notion that might cut free from our folk conception of humility altogether.
5. Driver, 1989, for example, argues that ignorance of certain propositions is vital for the development
of some virtues. Being aware that one is modest, for instance, can be a barrier to sustaining one’s
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modesty. See also Brennan, 2007, for a related proposal (though here it is not inaccuracy as such
but rather holding oneself to higher standards than one would ever hold others to).
6. Interestingly, the idea that it is normal to overestimate one’s abilities and achievements has
significant support in the psychological literature, where it is known as the phenomenon of illusory
superiority. For a useful summary of some of this research, see Hoorens, 1993. See also Dunning
and Kruger, 1999, for a famous discussion of a related bias in the specifically cognitive realm.
7. See, especially, the hugely influential limitations-owning account of intellectual humility offered
by Whitcomb et al., 2017. See also Hazlett, 2012, and the doxastic proposal offered by Church,
2016. The latter differs from the former in some interesting ways, though they are not relevant for
our current purposes. For a useful discussion of these differences, see Barrett and Church, 2016.
8. Interestingly, the most developed defence of this approach to intellectual humility—found in
Whitcomb et al., 2017—does not even consider this kind of problem, even though it covers a
compendium of potential issues facing the view. The reason for this is that its consideration of
potential difficulties facing the proposal turns on what it regards as the alternative conceptions of
intellectual humility that are available. But it fails to recognise the appeal of the positive account
of intellectual humility that we will be looking at in the next section (see also endnote 9).
9. See Roberts and Wood, 2003 and 2007, for two important defences of this approach. See also
Tanesini, 2016, Priest, 2017, and Pritchard, 2018a and 2019. Note that in their influential defence
of the ‘owning one’s limitations’ account of intellectual humility,Whitcomb et al., 2017 effectively
ignore this proposal since they mischaracterise it as the view that one should be disposed to have
a ‘low concern for one’s own intellectual status and entitlements’ (p. 6). But this is at most a
consequence of the view, rather than the view itself. Indeed, given that this way of characterising
the position is so egocentric, it is arguably not even that. In any case, what is key to the position
is rather that it is grounded in an intellectual concern for others, something that Whitcomb et al.,
2017 completely miss.
Note too that on this proposal intellectual humility will entail open-mindedness, a cognitive
trait which is itself often said to be an intellectual virtue. Indeed, one might be tempted as a result
to treat these two intellectual virtues as simply manifestations of a single general virtue. I think that
this would be a mistake, however, as one can be open-minded without thereby being intellectually
humble. For example, if one has heard the case for a certain opposing position before, then it is
consistent with the demands of open-mindedness that one dismisses it out of hand and declines
to listen to it presented again. But intellectual humility might well require one to listen, out of
one’s respect for the other person’s opinions. For some recent discussions of open-mindedness,
see Baehr, 2011, Pritchard, 2019, and Riggs, 2010.
10. Indeed, it is arguable that it is not just specifically intellectual benefits that count in this regard,
but non-intellectual benefits to others too. For example, in intellectually respecting others one
will contribute to their self-esteem, but this looks very much like a non-intellectual good. For our
current purposes, however, I will set this complication to one side.
11. One might be tempted to ask at this juncture why, if this is so, intellectual humility counts as
an intellectual virtue specifically? Are not intellectual virtues to be evaluated purely in terms of
intellectual goods like true belief? The first thing to note here is that it is in fact quite common
for intellectual virtues to also promote non-intellectual goods, just as many moral virtues also
promote intellectual goods. (Think about the virtue of courage in this regard, which could be
specifically intellectual, or specifically moral, or both). But even setting this complication to one
side, I think the objection is based on a crude way of understanding a concern for truth, as if this
could simply be measured in terms of counting true propositions believed. In fact, I think we need
a much richer conception of what desire for the truth is if we are to capture what is most important
about our epistemic practices (for example, what constitutes good inquiry). I explore these issues
in a number of places but see especially Pritchard, 2014a, 2016a, 2016c, and forthcoming.
12. This point is important to understandingwhy non-concessive treatments of the epistemology of peer
disagreement are not in tension with the demands of intellectual humility, as many commentators
(often tacitly) suppose. See Pritchard, 2012, 2018a and 2019 for further discussion of this issue.
Note too that this point is particularly important given the difficulties that plague conciliatory
approaches to the epistemology of peer disagreement, as defended by Christensen (2007), Elga
(2007), and Feldman (2007). For example, that they seem to entail that one needs to be concessive
about the very truth of concessive approaches to the epistemology of peer disagreement, given that
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disagreement about the epistemology of peer disagreement is rife—though see Elga, 2010, for a
defence of concessive approaches in this regard.
13. Special thanks to David Bakhurst for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. This
paper has benefitted from two grants awarded by the Templeton Foundation, both of them for
projects hosted at the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre. These are: (i) the ‘Virtue
Epistemology, Epistemic Dependence and Intellectual Humility’ project, which was itself part
of the wider ‘Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility Project’ hosted by Saint Louis
University; and (ii) the ‘Intellectual Humility MOOC’ project.
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